Classical Influences in America

Classical Education in the Early American Republic
Education in the early American Republic was deeply rooted in antiquity. Based on the traditional model of the European curriculum, the study of ancient Greek and Latin grammar and the reading of primary texts occupied a good portion of the days of white males who were fortunate enough to receive an education (Bederman 4). As Meyer Reinhold states, “The dominance of classical education was preserved by the force of tradition, the influence of clergymen in the governance of schools and colleges, and the social status attaching to classical education” (Reinhold 221). Because the learning of Greek and Latin was—and continues to be—a time consuming feat, it was only those individuals whose family could afford for their child to spend their time studying the ancient languages that received an education. Therefore, because of its elitist nature, with the classical education naturally came a higher social status. Of the fifty-six men who debated the Declaration of Independence at the Continental Congress, twenty-seven had received some amount of higher education, and out of the thirty-nine men who signed the Constitution, twenty-three had earned a college degree (Bederman 7).

While Classics constituted a large portion of the educational system employed throughout the American colonies, there were limitations to the classical scholarship that could be carried out. On the one hand, Richard M. Gummere makes the argument that the classical sources that were available in the colonies were not read in translation but in the original Latin or Greek. He states, “Most of the Convention delegates were at home in Latin, and some in Greek” (Gummere 4). Because of their proficiency, they did not have to rely on English translations. In contrast, David J. Bederman argues that the colonists did, in fact, have to rely on English translations, not because of a lack of necessary philological knowledge but because the available editions were often corrupt (Bederman 13). Alongside textual corruption, the available editions of the Greek and Latin texts often omitted those passages that were seen by members of the colonies to be morally corrupting or to be promoting a polytheistic religious ideology and subsequently going against the monotheistic religion practiced by most colonists.1 The colonists’ understanding of the classical world was not complete due to the corruption of the editions and the sources having been purposefully edited to adhere to their religious beliefs and practices. Bederman describes the classical sources and their relationship with the colonists in the following manner: “The classics were what they were: a common body of material, commonly used, or misused, by educated men for their own purposes” (Bederman 14).

As previously stated, the classical curriculum employed in the primary and secondary schools, and in the colleges and universities established throughout the colonies, was adopted from the traditional European curriculum. It was not originally conceived by the colonists, but it was utilized by them due to its being a point of familiarity, and in order to show their former oppressors that they too were educated, elite, sophisticated, and—most importantly—they were not inferior. However, not everyone in the colonies used the classical model for their educational purposes. For example, the Quaker communities opted for an education that taught “practical subjects” and focused on the grammar of the English language, as opposed to languages which were no longer spoken (Reinhold 222). The Puritans, also, feared that a classical education would diminish the superiority of their own religious teachings and would result in the moral decline of the people (Reinhold 221).

As was previously touched upon, there did exist an air of elitism that was attached to the classical education that the colonists of the upper classes received. One had to be able not only to afford the cost of schooling, but also to devote substantial amounts of time to the learning of ancient Greek and Latin, time which could have been utilized for more financially profitable endeavors. Even when a student reached the university, their education continued to be rooted in the study of antiquity. Questioning the necessity of learning the grammar of dead languages, during the early eighteenth century and post-American Revolution there were those colonists who began to argue that the laborious learning of both Greek and Latin was no longer pragmatic, and that this curriculum did not allow education for all. Instead, they advocated for vocational training and the study of subjects that were deemed useful, such as the English language. Reinhold argues, “Despite the continuity and strength of the classical tradition in colonial America, the widespread faith in education among all classes of the population raised questions about the value of a classical education for all students” (Reinhold 222). The life of every individual did not lie on the same trajectory, nor did everyone reside in the upper social classes that allowed them the luxury to learn Greek and Latin. As a result, there existed a growing concern for those students who needed an education but would not profit from the learning of the classical languages. Therefore, many began calling for the complete elimination of Classics’ prominent role at the head of the school curriculum and its replacement with useful subjects.

To replace the classical education, some colonists supported one that was more utilitarian. As Reinhold claims, in 1749 Benjamin Franklin called for the “liberalization of the curriculum,” and promoted the usefulness of the study of modern foreign languages as opposed to those which were no longer spoken (Reinhold 224). At this time, many of the classical texts were available in English translation; therefore, there no longer seemed to be a need for the study of Greek and Latin. However, Franklin promoted the discontinuing of the classical education model despite having taught himself and his son Latin. Stanley M. Burstein argues that Franklin “read classical literature in translation, formed his own literary style on classical models, drew on the works of moralists such as Xenophon, Seneca and Plutarch for his ethical theories, and wrongly boasted that his 1744 edition of James Logan’s translation of Cicero’s De Senecute (On Old Age) was the first classical translation produced in the new world” (Burstein 31). The fact that many classical texts were widely available in English translation served as a basis for the argument that it would be more useful to study the English language before one studied Latin and Greek. In 1779, Thomas Jefferson— despite his own classical education and affinity for the classics—decided to eliminate the study of Greek and Latin from the curriculum at the College of William and Mary. According to Reinhold, this discontinuing of classical language study was not because Jefferson did not approve of the classical education, but because “the essentials of the classical languages were expected to be taught in the grammar schools of Virginia, and because the income was needed to provide instructors of scientific and other subjects” (Reinhold 226). In seeming contradiction to his removal of Greek and Latin study at the College of William of Mary, in 1826, Jefferson required proficiency exams in both Latin and Greek for admission to the University of Virginia, examinations that became one of the determining factors for one’s admission to the universities and colleges in the colonies.

Of all those who disapproved of the classical curriculum, Benjamin Rush proved to be most outspoken concerning the need for a more utilitarian and inclusive approach to education. Rush argued that the grueling study of Greek and Latin caused many boys to drop out of school, causing them to engage in behavior that tarnished their status in society and morality; he also took up the argument rooted in religion, namely that the polytheism and the nature of the classical divinities were morally degenerating forces to which students should not be exposed (Reinhold 229-230). However—like Franklin—Rush himself was well educated in the classics and did not seem to disapprove of their study in its entirety.

While the boisterous arguments of those who opposed an education rooted in the classical tradition failed at first to effect change, it is clear that this desire for a change in the curriculum coincided with the development of a new American identity. The classical education model served as a link between the American colonies and the English from whom they were trying to separate. The establishing of a new method and approach to education would only assist the colonists in their development of a unique identity that was separate from their English oppressors. Furthermore, the classical education was not for every student, and in response to a call for the education of all, there were some colonists who insisted on more vocational training and education in the sciences. However, it would not be until the 1820s, when “population growth, industrialization, and the upsurge of a strong middle class” resulted in the establishment of “free, utilitarian public high schools,” that the traditional classical model of education would meet its first effective challenge (Reinhold 234). The classical model persisted despite the constant attacks and questioning of its place in the education system, and it continued to serve as a social identity for the American colonists. The acquiring of a classical education identified the white American male as sophisticated and civilized, and it served as a means of separation between the American colonists and the Native Americans whom the colonists, with the bias of their time, saw as their antithesis—crude and savage (Burstein 32-33). It also projected to their European neighbors a message saying that the American colonists were not inferior.

1 See Bederman pp. 13.

The current federal government of the United States is divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. This division provides a separation of powers, which allows for a system of checks and balances. This system of checks and balances is meant to ensure that no one branch of the government—nor one individual—obtains too much power.

The Legislative Branch

The current Legislative branch is comprised of Congress, which is then divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives” (US Const. Art. I, Sec. 1). Article I, Section 8 outlines the powers of Congress, providing both the Senate and the House of Representatives the authority to make laws and to declare war.

The Senate

100 senators, two from each state, serve a term of six years in the Senate. Each senator is elected by the American people whom she or he will represent. There are three classes of senators. According to the Constitution, “The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year” (Art. I, Sec. 3). Each senator must be 30 years old, have had United States citizenship for a minimum of 9 years, and must be a resident of the state which he or she will represent.

The House of Representatives

There is a maximum total of 435 members of the House of Representatives, each elected by the American people to serve a two-year term. The number of representatives from each state depends on the state’s population. Each representative must be 25 years old, a United States citizen for a minimum of 7 years, and a resident of the state which he or she will represent. There are five separate delegates who represent the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Puerto Rico is represented in the House by a resident commissioner.

The Executive Branch

“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” (US Const. Art. II, Sec. 1). Alongside the President of the United States, the current executive branch is comprised of the Vice President, the Cabinet, and the large administrative bodies that have grown up under each member of the Cabinet.

The President

The President is the Commander in Chief of the United States Army; he or she has the authority to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, and nominate “public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” (US Const. Art. II, Sec. 2). The current President is allowed to serve a maximum of eight years in office, must be thirty-five years old, and be a natural born United States citizen.

The Vice President

The Vice President assumes the office of the presidency if the current President is unable to carry out his or her term. The Vice President also serves as the President of the Senate, and casts his vote in the Senate in the case of tie.

The Cabinet

The President selects the members of his or her Cabinet. Each member serves as an advisor to the presidency. A President’s Cabinet is comprised of the Vice President, the heads of the 15 executive departments, and other government officials of high rank.

The Judicial Branch

“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” (US Const. Art. III, Sec. 1). The judicial branch holds the power to interpret the meaning of the laws and to decide if certain laws are or are not constitutional. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States. It is comprised of nine members, a Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices. Each member of the Supreme Court serves a life term. In addition to the Supreme Court, the Constitution allows Congress to formulate “inferior courts,” which are today referred to as federal courts.

Checks and Balances

While the President of the United States is able to appoint the members of his or her Cabinet, Congress holds the authority to veto any of those nominations. If necessary, Congress is also able to remove the current President from the presidential office. In turn, the President is able to veto the laws that Congress votes to pass. With respect to the judicial branch, whomever the President nominates to be the justices of the Supreme Court must be agreed upon by the Senate.

A Need for Informed and Careful Analysis

In Federalist No. 1, Alexander Hamilton writes: “It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” It is here that Hamilton, under the pseudonym Publius, rhetorically questions whether he and his fellow revolutionaries are able to create and build a unified, energetic, and moderate government, one that will be able to endure a variety of challenges by means of careful deliberation of both history and their own experiences.

The American revolutionaries set out to build a new nation, one with a government that was to be radically different from the rule that they were denouncing. In his 1939 article, “Classical Influences on the American Revolution,” Charles F. Mullett argues that the colonists needed to seek historical exempla in order to support the necessity of their decision to separate from Great Britain and establish their own independence. This required that they scour “two thousand years of history; and as a result Greek and Roman elements were found which contributed to the formulation of the ideology by which the colonists justified their opposition to British policy and their claim to greater freedom” (Mullett 92). Not only did these ancient sources provide models of government to both replicate and use as a cautionary tale, but Mullett claims that they also served the purpose of “window-dressing” one’s letter, speech, or newspaper publication; for these references to the classical past bolstered one’s argument. According to Richard M. Gummere in his 1962 article, “The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution,” classical Greek and Roman sources were never more frequently used “than during the preliminary discussions, the debates on the Constitution, the ratifying conventions, the Federalist papers and such publications as John Dickinson’s Fabius Letters” (Gummere 3). However, in opposition to Mullett’s claim, it appears that these ancient texts were not simply “window-dressings” but instead provided a necessary basis which enabled the Americans to begin developing not only a new form of government, but also a new unique identity. Hamilton, his fellow federalist writers, and revolutionaries knew that this new government, this new identity, could be successfully crafted only if they, as a unified body, performed careful and thorough study of the historical past.

John Jay, in Federalist No. 3, seems to answer Hamilton’s previous question in Federalist No. 1 by characterizing the Americans as people who do, in fact, carefully deliberate and reflect upon the past in order to make proper decisions. He opens his paper with the following statement: “It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.”

Jay and his fellow citizens are both “intelligent and well-informed.” Therefore, they do not have to “depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” Instead, they are able to utilize their education and the intelligence that it has cultivated in order to make the correct decision in ratifying the Constitution of the United States.

It must also be noted that it was not solely the supporters of the Constitution who called for careful and thoughtful deliberation on the historical past. The anti-Federalists continually urged the American people to perform a close examination of the proposed Constitution and past historical examples of government in order to make a well-informed decision on whether to ratify the document. An individual under the pseudonym of “John DeWitt” asked in an essay that was first published on October 22, 1787, “Are we to adopt this Government, without an examination?” According to DeWitt, the Federalists were encouraging the people to hastily vote in favor of the Constitution without fully understanding what the document said or the consequences that might follow if this new form of government were to be put into place. It was imperative that the Constitution “undergo a candid and strict examination.” At the forefront of a second essay published on October 27, 1787, DeWitt proclaimed: “In my last address upon the proceedings of the Federal Convention, I endeavored to convince you of the importance of the subject, that it required a cool, dispassionate examination, and a thorough investigation, previous to its adoption—that it was not a mere revision and amendment of our first Confederation, but a compleat System for the future government of the United States, and I may now add in preference to, and in exclusion of, all other heretofore adopted.—It is not TEMPORARY, but in its nature, PERPETUAL.”

Patrick Henry, in his speech to the Virginia Convention of 1788 (first published on June 7 of the same year), states that, on the surface, the Constitution looks beautiful; however, when one is able to examine it closely, when one is able to fully understand its contents, its features are actually quite ugly: “This constitution is said to have beautiful features; but when I come to examine these features, Sir, they appear to me horridly frightful: Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting; it squints towards monarchy: And does not this raise indignation in the breast of every American?”

Throughout this website it is shown that both the Federalists and the anti-Federalists repeatedly called for a close and careful examination of both the historical past and their present in order to make well-informed decisions. The speeches, pamphlets, and letters of the American founders provide detailed examples from the classical past for their listeners and readers, requiring them to partake in the careful study necessary for them to make the proper decision. The revolutionaries—both those who supported the Constitution and those who opposed its ratification—knew that the decision that was to be made at the Constitutional Convention would impact not only the current citizens of the United States, but its future generations. They actively utilized the past in order to plan for the future.

The Need for a Unified Central Government

In order to illustrate America’s need for one central government, as opposed to thirteen independent governments, the Federalists turned to the examples provided by the ancient Greek states.

In Federalist No. 6, Alexander Hamilton argues that to think that the American republic could survive in a state of division, free of warfare and dissention, would be to ignore the course of events of human history. Hamilton then draws his first example from Plutarch’s Life of Pericles. Pericles, an Athenian general, led his army in a battle against the Samians, a fellow Greek city-state, in what is now known as the Samian War. The general was living with a concubine, Aspasia of Miletus, whom Plutarch describes as a prostitute; according to Plutarch, Pericles urged this attack in order to please his beloved. In chapter twenty-five, Plutarch writes, “They accuse Pericles of getting the assembly to vote in favor of the war against the Samians on behalf of the Milesians, since Aspasia begged,” (τὸν δὲ πρὸς Σαμίους πόλεμον αἰτιῶνται μάλιστα τὸν Περικλέα ψηφίσασθαι διὰ Μιλησίους Ἀσπασίας δεηθείσης.) Hamilton recalls this example when he says, “The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute, at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians” (Federalist No. 6). Hamilton proceeds to further utilize his knowledge of Pericles:
“The same man, stimulated by private pique against the Megarensians, another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice in a supposed theft of the statuary of Phidias, or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity, or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesian war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.”

Hamilton paints a picture of Pericles that highlights his avariciousness, his preoccupation with his own self and gain, and it was these characteristics that caused the ultimate demise of Athens. These vices are only natural in man, and Hamilton argues that they would certainly occur amongst the various leaders of the separate American governments, thus causing them to go to war with one another if there were no strong federal government.

In Federalist No. 9, Alexander Hamilton again illustrates America’s need for a unified and strong central government. He validates this need by claiming:
“It is impossible to read this history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.”

Fortunately, the American colonists had knowledge that the ancients did not, which would allow them to avoid making those same political mistakes.

However, the Federalists were aware that establishing one unified government would not quell all sources of faction between the states of the new Republic. James Madison states that the seeds of faction are inherent to the nature of man, and that they will always manifest themselves in various circumstances (Federalist No. 10). Man is naturally greedy, jealous, and filled with passions that, at times, are not able to be controlled; according to Hamilton in Federalist No. 15, these inherent vices are why a government is needed at all; for history proves that without a strong unitary and unified governmental system, those defects in character naturally lead to internal dissension.

The Federalists, once more, turn to the Greek city states and their experiences with leagues and alliances. They compared both to their current political situation in order to prove why the current government of the United States—under the Articles of Confederation— would not be able to sustain the nation, and that in order to ensure its longevity, they needed a strong central government. In ancient practice, each city-state retained the notion of its independence and was allotted “equal votes in the federal council” (Federalist No. 18). However, according to Publius in Federalist No. 18:
“The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination. It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgement went in favor of the most powerful party.”

Any reprieve from war was filled with that internal dissension of which Federalist No. 10 initially warned. In fact, “Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes” (Federalist No. 18). For the Federalists, the leagues of Greek city-states clearly illustrated how the governments of the larger states, if each were to remain independent, would be ruled by their own ambition and jealousy; in turn, they would then rule over the smaller states.

Not only would there exist continual internal dissension amongst the states if America were to remain under the Articles of Confederation, but the states, as a whole, would be more susceptible to external attacks, which proved to be the reason for Greece falling under the dominion of Macedon and then Rome. According to Publius, the Achaean League provides a good example, although there seemed to exist “infinitely more moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less violence and sedition in the people” (Federalist No. 18). However, each city eventually became primarily interested in its own interests, which resulted in the dissolution of the league. “Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions” (Federalist No. 18). Publius then claims that this division eventually invited the tyranny of Rome, and that she “found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced” (Federalist No. 18).

America did not have to rely solely on the example of the ancient Greek republics, for by the time that Publius had published the Federalist, America had already seen its own internal strife. As a result of the economic turmoil experienced by America following the Revolution, the rural farmers of Massachusetts (amongst others) found themselves unable to pay back their debts, as well as the taxes that were imposed upon them by the state government, a situation that was only exacerbated since many individuals who had fought in the war were not able to receive the pay that they had earned. In turn, many farmers either had their entire farm repossessed or were jailed by law enforcement for lack of payment. This resulted in Daniel Shays, a veteran of the Revolution, leading other debt-ridden citizens in an armed uprising against the government of Massachusetts. Alexander Hamilton reflects upon Shay’s Rebellion in Federalist No. 21: “The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York”?

What further dissension amongst the states would Shay have caused if his revolt had been successful? What other wars would have ensued throughout the states? How long would it have been before another country preyed upon the weakness of American faction, causing this new nation to follow in the footsteps of her ancient Greek predecessors?

Supporting Publius and his arguments made in the Federalist, John Dickinson wrote and published his own letters under the pseudonym Fabius, in which he supported the ratification of the proposed Constitution and the need for a strong central government. In his first letter—published in 1788—Fabius argues that those who oppose the call for a strong unitary government have erred: “Probably nothing would operate so much for the correction of these errors, as the perusal of the accounts transmitted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in Greece by a conduct founded on similar mistakes. They are expressly ascribed to this cause—that each city meditated a part on its own profit and ends—insomuch that those who seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own interests and advancement, while they deliberated for the public.”

Like the Greek city-states, if the American states each had their own government, they could easily appear to promote the union of the nation, but each would remain primarily interested in their own “interests and advancements.”

The natural result would be the demise of the American republic. For Fabius, history teaches us —if allowed—that the nature of man has been and will continue to be the cause of the destruction of republics. A strong central government, however, would safeguard the liberties of the people against the detrimental forces of man’s vices. In his third letter, Fabius writes, “It is more pleasing, and may be more profitable to reflect, that their tranquility and prosperity have commonly been promoted, in proportion to the strength of their government for protecting the worthy against the licentious.”

In opposition to the notion that America needed a strong central government were the anti-Federalists, whose primary argument rested on the notion that a consolidated government would strip the states of their individual liberties, and that this one central government would eventually morph into a tyranny ruling over a powerless people. In a speech that was first published on June 5, 1788, Patrick Henry spoke at the Virginia Convention of 1788 in an attempt to show the dangers of ratifying the proposed Constitution. At the forefront of his speech, Henry claimed, “Here is a revolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is as radical, if in this transition our rights and privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the States be relinquished: And cannot we plainly see, that this is actually the case?” He then goes on to state that his audience only has to look at the examples of ancient Greece and Rome in order to find similar situations where individuals have lost “their liberty by their own carelessness and the ambition of a few.” Henry does not provide the specific examples to which he alludes, signifying that he expects his audience to be well acquainted with the histories of the ancient republics. In a speech published two days later from the Virginia Convention, Henry continues to argue that the proposed Constitution will, in fact, allow for a monarchy, and that the President will become a king. Therefore, the independence from monarchial rule for which the American people had just fought would be for naught: “Away with your President, we shall have a King: The army will salute him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him King, and fight against you: And what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and your rights?” It is clear that the speeches of Patrick Henry echo the sentiments found in the “Centinel” articles, the first of which was published on October 5, 1787. Henry utilizes similar rhetoric to that used by Centinel, who, writing to the freemen of Pennsylvania, warns that if they are to adopt the proposed Constitution as is, then they will certainly lose all of the individual liberties that are granted to them under the Articles of Confederation.

In a piece first published under the classical pseudonym Brutus on October 18, 1787, the author addresses the “Citizens of the State of New York”—just as each paper of the Federalist was addressed to “the People of the State of New York”— highlighting the importance of the decision that is to be made concerning the proposed Constitution, and the lasting impact that it will have for generations to come. He then proceeds to the purpose of his first letter, which is to object to the need for a strong central government. Brutus does this by employing the same argumentation used by Henry and the Centinel, claiming that the ratification of the Constitution would immediately void the liberties of the states, who would then no longer have a President, but instead be forced under the rule of a tyrant. However, Brutus further develops his argument and states that one central government would not be able to rule over a territory as vast as the United States. For this he refers back to the republics of ancient Greece and Rome: “History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.”

For Brutus it was the size of the Greek and Roman republics that caused their respective downfalls. A true free government is only able to govern over a small territory, such as that of an individual state, and if the Constitution were to be ratified, there would be too many representatives, who are expressing too many different opinions, with the result that “there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other.”

There existed a need not only to refer back to the ancient exempla but also to understand the present circumstances in their entirety in order to make a well-informed and a subjectively correct decision. The examples of the ancient Greek and Roman governments provided the founding generation both a way to critically analyze their current reality, and a way by which to predict the future. They all were aware that the decisions that they were asked to make concerning the government of the United States would not only result in immediate impact, but also affect the generations to come.

Mixed Government and a System of Checks and Balances

The Histories of Polybius taught the founding generation the need for a mixed government, one that was equipped w­ith an effective system of checks and balances. In order to decide upon the best form of mixed government, Polybius states that it is of the most importance to thoroughly study the different types of constitutions (διόπερ οὐ τῆς τυχούσης ἐπιστάσεως προσδεῖται καὶ θεωρίας, εἰ μέλλοι τις τὰ διαφέροντα καθαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ συνόψεσθαι, 6.3.4). This echoes the claims made by both the Federalists and the anti-Federalists concerning the need for a careful study of historical exempla as well as of the current proposed Constitution.

According to Polybius there are three different constitutions of interest: kingship, aristocracy, and democracy (ὧν τὸ μὲν καλοῦσι βασιλείαν, τὸ δ᾽ἀριστοκρατίαν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημοκρατίαν, 6.3.6), and when these three constitutions are mixed, the result is the best possible form of government. Rome—during the Hannibalic war—had an exemplary constitution and was nearly a perfect state due to its mixture of the monarchial, democratic, and aristocratic (Ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς Ξέρξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα **** καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτεσιν ὔστερον ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προδιευκρινουμένων ἦν καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς Ἀννιβιακοῖς, 6.11.1). At the time of the war with Hannibal, the Roman government was headed by two consuls—each elected annually by the popular assembly (Comitia Centuriata). The consuls, one of patrician status and the other of plebeian rank, served as the heads of their own respective armies, proposed legislation, and were able to veto each other’s proposals and decisions. The members of the Senate were strictly of patrician rank and served a life term unless forcibly removed from office. Polybius tells of the Senate’s control of the treasury (ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ταμιείου κυρίαν, 6.13.1), and their power to preside over cases concerning crimes that were committed in Italy. They also held the authority to dispatch embassies outside of Italy (6.13.2-7). With regards to the role of the people, the Plebeian Tribunes had the sole power to give honors and judge in trials that concerned the highest officials. They were also able to veto laws and approve or reject both treaties and alliances.

Polybius claims that if one were to look solely at the consuls they would see a monarchial constitution; if at the Senate alone, they would see the constitution of an aristocracy. If one were only to examine the Plebeian Tribunes, they would see a solely democratic government. For the historian, the mixture of these three constitutions allowed for the Romans to live under a government that resided near perfection. This mixture of constitutions also fostered an effective and necessary system of checks and balances. If a consul wanted to go to war, he must have had the support of both the Senate and the Plebeian Tribunes (δοκεῖ μὲν αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τῶν προκειμένων συντέλειαν, προσδεῖται δὲ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς συγκλήτου, 6.15.3). Because the Senate was in charge of the state’s funds, it was necessary that they consent to the various financial requests of the consul so that the latter could receive the required capital. It is also imperative that the consuls remain in good favor with the Plebeian Tribunes, since they had the power to approve or deny the treaties and armistices (ὁ γὰρ τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ συνθήκας ἀκύρους καὶ κυρίας ποιῶν, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὗτος ἐστιν, 6.15.10).

The Plebeian Tribunes provided checks on the Senate, for if the Senate desired to judge the crimes of which the highest officials of the state were accused, those which would result in the death or severe punishment of the accused, the Tribunes would then have been required to consent to a senatus consultum, allowing the Senate to have the judicial power (6.16.1-3). Moreover, on any decision that the Senate agreed upon, the Plebeian Tribunes had the ability to veto their conclusion; for the Plebeian Tribunes were meant to serve as representatives of the needs and wishes of the plebeian class (ὀφείλουσι δ᾽ἀεὶ ποιεῖν οἱ δήμαρχοι τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ μάλιστα στοχάζεσθαι τῆς τούτου βουλήσεως, 6.16.5). Finally, the Tribunes also needed to remain in the favor of the Senate, as the latter served as the judge in civil trials, and the plebeian class relied on the contracts from members of the Senate that allowed for maintenance and construction of public infrastructure. Polybius concludes this analysis of the checks and balances present in the Roman constitution by stating that because one part of the government was able to hinder or support another, as a unified whole they were able to best protect their citizens and state; therefore, one would find it difficult to find a better government (6.18.1-2):

Τοιαύτης δ᾽οὔσης τῆς ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ καὶ βλάπτειν καὶ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοις, πρὸς πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς περιστάσεις δεόντως ἔχειν τὴν ἁρμογὴν αὐτῶν, ὥστε μὴ οἷόν τ᾽εἶναι ταύτης εὑρεῖν ἀμείνω πολιτείας σύστασιν.

Polybius influenced the founding generation to such a degree that, according to Richard M. Gummere, Thomas Jefferson would ship “copies of Polybius and sets of ancient authors” to James Madison and George Wythe from Paris (Wythe 4). For the colonists, Polybius served as the primary source of information concerning the Greek city-states, and—as has already been shown—the perfect mixture of government, equipped with the necessary checks and balances, employed by the Romans during the war with Hannibal. In Federalist No. 51, Publius argues for this same division of power in order to perpetuate the American Republic. In order to effectively divide the power between the three branches, they must construct “the interior structure of the government as that its several constituents parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper place” (Federalist No. 51). This system of checks and balances was argued as imperative for safeguarding the people’s liberties.

However, there was not unanimous agreement to a tripartite governmental system. At the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson argued that, “A plurality in the Executive Government would probably produce a tyranny as bad as the thirty Tyrants of Athens, or as the Decemvirs of Rome” (Farrand, I.74). Edmund Randolph also voiced his objections, questioning whether “a Council would be sufficient to check the improper views of an ambitious Man” (Farrand I.74). Would the liberties of the Americans even be protected by the proposed system of checks and balances?

The Legislative Branch

Of the three branches of government, the construction of the legislative branch was most influenced by the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. The legislative branch of the United States federal government, composed of both a Senate and a House of Representatives, echoes the division of legislative power that existed between the Senate and the Plebeian Tribunes in that of Rome. In his thirty-fourth Federalist paper, Publius speaks of the coexistence of the Comitia Centuriata and the Comitia Tributa, which allowed the Roman republic to attain “the utmost height of human greatness.” According to Federalist No. 52, the primary concern of the House of Representatives—similar to that of the Plebeian Tribunes—rests in the interests of the American citizens, “so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.” The Senate, serving as the second body of the legislative branch, is meant to be a “salutary check on the government” (Federalist No. 62).

Writing under the pseudonym “Fabius,” John Dickinson argues in favor of the establishment of a Senate and argues that it must be strong in order to preserve the American Republic. Utilizing his knowledge of ancient Greece and Rome, Dickinson states (Fabius Letters No. 5): “In Carthage and Rome, there was a very numerous senate, strengthened by prodigious attachments, and in a great degree independent of the people. In Athens, there was a senate strongly supported by the powerful court of Areopagus. In each of these republics, their affairs at length became convulsed, and their liberty was subverted. What cause produced these effects? Encroachments of the senate upon the authority of the people? No! but directly the reverse, according to the unanimous voice of the historians; that is, encroachments of the people upon the authority of the senate.”

While there existed a strong senatorial structure, the Roman and Greek republics prospered; however, once the strength of that necessary component began to dissolve, so did their independent political structures. Yet the Senate itself was not at fault; instead, it was the citizens themselves, and they were only delayed in their destruction due to the “remnants of senatorial authority” (Fabius Letters No. 5). Here, Dickinson is thinking specifically of Julius Caesar. He quotes Francis Bacon in a footnote, who wrote, “His [Caesar’s] first artifice was to break the strength of the Senate, for while that remained safe, there was no opening for any person to immoderate or extraordinary power,— ‘Nam initio sibi erant frangendae senatus opes et auctoritas qua salva nemini ad immodica et extra ordinaria imperia aditus erat.’” It was an external force that caused the dissolution of the Roman Senate, and it was only while there remained a small portion of the congressional body that Rome was protected from Caesar’s tyrannical force.

Throughout his fifth letter, Dickinson continues to draw his historical information directly from Polybius, citing and echoing the historian in his analysis of the congressional bodies of both the Amphictyonic council and the Achaean League. With regard to the former, their “authority was very great: But, the parts were not sufficiently combined, to guard against the ambitious, avaricious, and selfish projects of some of them” (Fabius Letters No. 5). On the contrary, the Congress of the Achaean League was consistent throughout to such a degree that the League seemed to be just one state. Quoting Polybius, Dickinson states:

“From their incorporation” says Polybius, “may be dated the birth of that greatness, that by a constant augmentation, at length arrived to a marvelous height of prosperity. The fame of their wise laws and mild government reached the Greek colonies in Italy, where the Grotoniates, the Sybarites, and the Cauloniates, agreed to adopt them, and to govern their states comfortably.”

Because its members established a strong congressional body, the Achaean League was far more prosperous than the Amphictyonic Council. Dickinson does not deny that the League had its faults; however, despite its defects, it was because of the League’s Congress and the representation that it offered the people that their overall happiness and success was increased (Fabius Letters No. 5): “With all its defects, with all its disorders, yet such was the life and vigor communicated through the whole, by the popular representation of each part, and the close combination of all, that the true spirit of republicanism predominated, and thereby advanced the happiness and glory of the people to so pre-eminent a state that our ideas upon the pleasing theme cannot be too elevated.”

The congressional body of the Achaean League had its flaws and was not designed in a manner that would foster its longevity; however, because the American colonists were thoroughly aware of the errors made by the Achaean League, they were able to avoid them in their own plan for a congressional body. It is important to note that this proves to be the framework in which the founding generation commonly analyzed and discussed the ancient republics of both Greece and Rome. There exist many positive aspects of both polities; however, the founding generation must not forget that all of the republics that are under analysis eventually reached their demise. Not only was it imperative to study these examples, but it was equally important that they knew their nature to such a degree that allowed the founding generation to effectively learn from their mistakes.

In opposition to the Federalist agenda and the establishment of a Senate, a series of letters, published under the pseudonym “Brutus,” appeared in the New York Journal during the months of October 1787 and April 1788. In his sixth letter, published on December 27, 1787, Brutus continues his argument that Congress, as defined in the Constitution, is allotted too much power that will go unchecked. In fact, it will destroy the liberty and power of the state governments. He argues that the people will become overburdened with having to pay taxes to both the federal and their respective state governments. As a result, Congress will have to eliminate the power of the state governments to tax their citizens. According to Brutus, “The conclusion therefore is inevitable, that the respective state governments will not have the power to raise one shilling in any way, but by the permission of the Congress” (Brutus Letters No. 6). If the state governments are not able to raise their own money, then they will naturally become “dependent on the will of the general government for their existence” (Brutus Letters No. 6). In other words, the state governments will each become subject to the tyrannical rule of the Senate. In a lengthy passage, Brutus characterizes the powers of the Senate: “This power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into every corner of the city, and country—It will wait upon the ladies as their toilett, and will not leave them in any of their domestic concerns; it will accompany them to the ball, the play, and the assembly; it will go with them when they visit, and will, on all occasions, sit beside them in their carriages, nor will it desert them even at church; it will enter the house of every gentleman, watch over his cellar, wait upon his cook in the kitchen, follow the servants into the parlour, preside over the table, and note down all he eats or drinks; it will attend him to his bed-chamber, and watch him while he sleeps; it will take cognizance of the professional man in his office, or his study; it will watch the merchant in the counting-house, or in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop, and in his work, and will haunt him in his family, and in his bed; it will be a constant companion of the industrious farmer in all his labour, it will be with him in the house, and in the field, observe the toil of his hands, and the sweat of his brow; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and finally, it will light upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these different classes of people, and in all these circumstances, in which it will attend them, the language in which it will address them, will be GIVE! GIVE!”

Brutus’ characterization of the Senate reveals that he is playing to his readers’ fears of the avaricious nature of man. If the Constitution is ratified, then the liberties belonging to the state governments will be annihilated, and a tyrant will subsequently assume power. However, if the people were to heed the warnings of Brutus, they could rely on him to assassinate Julius Caesar and protect them from a despotic congressional body.

The Executive and Judicial Branches

With respect to the executive and judicial branches of the government, the argument for direct influence by the ancient Greek and Roman republics becomes more complicated. David J. Bederman states that “…there was no true separation of powers in the sense we understand today” (Bederman 81). He then proceeds to argue, “Powers in the idealized Roman Constitution may have been allocated to different offices and councils, but there was no separation of executive, legislative, judicial functions, and certainly no prohibition on the same magistrate or body exercising more than one of those prerogatives” (Bederman 81). It was not uncommon for one political body to infringe on the defined rights and authority of another, thus blurring the boundaries between the consuls, the Senate, and the Plebeian Tribunes.

The Consuls

With respect to the executive branch, the office of the consules bears a resemblance to the office of the President of the United States. The two Roman consuls, both elected annually by the comitia centuriata, possessed the highest executive power (imperium), which allowed them to preside over both the Senate and the Plebeian Tribunes. While the Senate had the authority to declare war, the consuls served as the commanders-in-chief of their own armies. The two consuls also had the authority to veto one another’s proposed laws, to appoint a dictator during a state of emergency, and to fill any vacancies that arose in the Senate.

The Process of Election

Similar to the restrictions on the presidency of the United States, there existed both an age limit and citizenship requirement. In order to be elected, the consul had to be at least forty-two years of age, hold Roman citizenship, and have previously served in other governmental offices. The process of their election began when one who wanted to become consul made a professio, “a preliminary announcement of one’s candidacy” (Abbott 170). Having announced that he was running for consul, the candidate would then begin to canvass in order to secure votes (the petitio). According to Frank Frost Abbott (Abbott 170):

Candidates for office appeared in the forum clad in a new whitened toga. They shook hands with voters, and took care to have a well-attended salutatio, and to be accompanied by large escorts in going to and fro. They sometimes gave largesses, contributed money out of their own pockets for the public games, and aimed at securing the support of guilds and political clubs.

As citizenship was extended to peoples outside of Rome, the candidate’s campaign trail spread across Italy.

The Office of the President and What Not to Do

While it is clear that those who outlined the powers invested in the office of the President were influenced to some degree by that of the Roman consuls, they also looked to the consules in order to learn what not to implement in their own executive branch. As has been illustrated, the Roman constitution called for two consuls. In an attempt to avoid conflict between the two authorities, it was required that “the consuls took turns month by month in exercising the right of the initiative” (Abbott 176). The consul who held the power for the given month was—at times—referred to as the consul maior. In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton as Publius argued that the United States should not have a plurality in the executive branch. Utilizing examples from both the Greek and Roman republics, he states, “We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for Consuls” (Federalist No. 70). If the United States were to have a dual presidency, the ambitious nature of man would certainly cause the destruction of their own republic. Both would be in a continuous battle for sole power, diminishing and ultimately hurting the executive branch. Furthermore, the two other branches and the American people could more easily watch and hold accountable one single president as opposed to two. As an example, Hamilton states, “The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been” (Federalist No. 70).

The Judicial Branch

Unlike the United States Constitution, the Roman constitution did not outline a unique and separate judicial branch. As Bederman states, “There was no real structural concept of judicial independence in ancient Rome. The crucial judicial office of the republic—the praetor—was an executive function” (Bederman 79). The office of the praetor was established by means of stripping the consules of specific judicial authority that they initially held. This specific office became necessary due to the increase in duties of the consuls, and the situation was exacerbated by the constant absence of the two consuls from Rome due to both their duty as commanders-in-chief and the constant warfare in which Rome frequently found herself (Abbott 37). Initially there was a sole praetor, but that changed with the establishment of a second (praetor urbanus). The office of praetor was then increased again in 227 BCE to four, and then to six in 197 BCE (Abbott 188). Ultimately, the number of praetors reached sixteen. In contrast to the judicial branch of the United States government, the Roman praetors were not solely judges. The praetor “acted as a judge, as a provincial governor, and as an administrative officer” (Abbott 189).

Concerning the judicial branch in relation to the executive and legislative branches, Publius states in Federalist No. 70: “…the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either a sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatsoever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgement; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgements.”

The proposed Constitution limits the judicial branch to such an extent that it is therefore argued by the Federalists to be the weakest branch of the government. The Supreme Court is only able to judge on whether laws that are made and passed by Congress are constitutional or not. However, the judicial branch is invested with complete judicial authority that cannot be imposed upon by the other two branches. In contrast, the Roman constitution allowed the Senate to serve as the “supreme judicial body” (Bederman 107). The American Congress, however, does have judicial power when it impeaches and tries a standing president.

Ultimately, unlike the copious ancient exempla that existed for the construction of the executive and legislative branches of the United States government, there existed very few ancient examples of a distinct judicial body to which the founding generation could refer. The ancient republics of Greece and Rome primarily influenced the founding generation in their construction of the legislative and executive branches.

Classical Pseudonyms and the Founding Generation

It is clear that the founding generation utilized ancient exempla throughout their speeches, pamphlets, letters, and debates advocating either the ratification or rejection of the proposed United States Constitution. Pulling their material primarily from historical writers and moralists, the colonists looked to the past in order to plan for the future and to receive guidance on the best form of government to employ. Not only did the founding generation utilize and learn from the examples provided by ancient Greece and Rome, but classical influences are also able to be found in the pseudonyms used by the writers of the pamphlets and letters published throughout the colonial period. These pseudonyms provided the writer not only with anonymity, but also a way by which to characterize the specific argument that was being made.

According to Livy in his history of Rome, Lucius Junius Brutus was named one of the first consuls after freeing Rome from the tyrannical, monarchial rule of Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (Duo consules inde comitiis centuriatis a praefecto urbis ex commentariis Ser. Tulli creati, L. Iunius Brutus et L. Tarquinius Collatinus, 1.60). Livy characterizes Brutus as the liberator, the one responsible for freeing Rome from her tyrannical oppressors and paving the way for the birth of the Roman Republic. With the publication of his first essay on October 18, 1787, “Brutus” was representing himself to his fellow citizens as the individual who was going to free them from the tyrannical rule that was proposed by the Constitution. In his essays, Brutus advocated against the ratification of the Constitution and a single unified government. One government could not effectively rule over the vast territory of the United States, and one central polity would naturally become king-like. When Robert Yates chose the pseudonym of “Brutus,” he purposefully characterized himself as the one who was going to protect the American people from the threat posed by the Constitution.

John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison published their Federalist papers under the pseudonym “Publius,” identifying themselves as Publius Valerius (Publicola), whom Plutarch claims Lucius Brutus approached first for help in the revolution against Tarquin Superbus (καὶ Λεύκιος Βροῦτος ἁπτόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς μεταβολῆς ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἦλθε τὸν Οὐαλλέριον καὶ χρησάμενος αὐτῷ προθυμοτάτω συνεξέβαλε τοὺς βασιλεῖς, Publ., 1.3-4). In contrast to the arguments that Brutus made in his essays, Publius argued for the ratification of the proposed Constitution and the need for a strong central government.

Robert Yates and the writers of the Federalist used the names of historical Romans who both fought to expel the kings from Rome and vowed to always protect their citizens from tyrannical, monarchial rule. However, Publius and Brutus found themselves on opposing sides in an America that had, also, just defeated the monarchial government of Britain. In their writings, both vowed to do the same thing—protect the American people from the rule of kings. For Publius, the only way to ensure that America would never again be under the rule of a monarchy was to develop and establish a unified, central government and no longer allow the Articles of Confederation to be in effect. Brutus, on the other hand, argued that the government proposed by the new Constitution was the new king whom the colonists needed to fear.

Despite resting on opposite sides during the debates of the Constitution, the figures of both Brutus and Publius were used not only in order to characterize their respective arguments, but also to characterize the overall situation in which the colonists found themselves. Like the Romans, they were oppressed by a monarchy and fought successfully to expel it from the American colonies. Like Brutus and Publius, the founding generation was given the task of developing a new republic, one that would forever denounce the rule of the king and fight against tyranny.

John Dickinson, in a series of letters that were published in 1788, signed his writings as “Fabius,” employing the identity of Fabius Maximus. During the war with Hannibal, Plutarch tells us, Fabius was calm, rational, and was not intimidated by the Carthaginian nor his army. Instead, he employed well-thought-out tactics that allowed him to ultimately defeat Hannibal. Plutarch states (Fab., II.4-5):

Φάβιον δὲ τὰ μὲν σημεῖα, καίπερ ἁπτόμενα πολλῶν, ἧττον ὑπέθραττε διὰ τὴν ἀλογίαν· τὴν δ᾽ὀλιγότητα τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τὴν ἀχρηματίαν πυνθανόμενος καρτερεῖν παρεκάλει τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ μὴ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἐπ᾽αὐτῷ τούτῳ διὰ πολλῶν ἀγώνον ἠσκημένῃ στρατιᾷ χρώμενον.

“But Fabius also was less troubled by the omens, which took hold of many because of irrationality; having learned that there were few enemies and that they lacked resources, he ordered the Romans to be patient and not to fight against a man who was supplied with an army that had been trained on account of many contests for this very circumstance”.

Fabius was rational and thought carefully about his course of action against Hannibal. By signing his letters as Fabius, Dickinson characterizes himself as sensible and his argument in support of the ratification of the Constitution as one that is well thought out. Similar to the use of the pseudonyms of “Publius” and “Brutus,” Dickinson’s pseudonym works to characterize the situation in which he and his fellow supporters of the Constitution find themselves. They are confronted with an enemy, the anti-Federalists, who object to a strong central government. However, the anti-Federalists are few in number compared to those who support the Constitution’s ratification and their resources are limited. By way of his letters, Fabius indirectly informs his fellow defenders that they must be patient and not readily engage in confrontation with the opposers of the Constitution. Instead, with their continued use of rational deliberation and argumentation, they will ultimately conquer their enemy.

Eran Shalev claims, “After the Revolution, antiquity was helpful in the process of constructing viable republican identities and as a means of envisioning the infant republic on a continuum of a republican tradition” (Shalev 163). The use of classical pseudonyms allowed the founding generation to use a familiar history as a means by which to speak about their current situation; it provided them a manner by which to conceptualize their own reality. Furthermore, the careful selection of pseudonyms made by the founding generation illustrated those virtues and characteristics that were to be desired and striven for by every citizen of the new American republic.

“A Timeline of the American Revolution from 1763 – 1787.” The American Revolution, The British Library, 8 June 2016

Abbott, Frank Frost. A History and Description of Roman Political Institutions. 3rd ed., Biblo and Tannen, 1963.

Adams, John. The Revolutionary Writings of John Adams. Edited by C. Bradley Thompson, Liberty Fund, Inc., 2000.

Bederman, David J. The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution: Prevailing Wisdom. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Burstein, Stanley M. “The Classics and the American Republic.” The History Teacher, vol. 30, no. 1, Nov. 1996, pp. 29–44.

Chicherio, Talia A. “James Madison and the Legacy of Cicero in US Statebuilding.” Unpublished paper, 2015, pp. 1–39.

Chinard, Gilbert. “Polybius and the American Constitution.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 1940, pp. 38–58.

Cogan, Neil H. Contexts of the Constitution: A Documentary Collection on Principles of American Constitutional Law. Foundation Press, 1999.

Franklin, Benjamin. The Portable Benjamin Franklin. Edited by Larzer Ziff, Penguin Books, 2005.

Gummere, Richard M. “The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution.” American Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1, 1962, pp. 3–18.

Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. Random House, INC.

——. The Revolutionary Writings of Alexander Hamilton. Edited by Joyce O. Appleby, Liberty Fund, Inc., 2008.

Jefferson, Thomas. The Essential Jefferson. Edited by Jean M. Yarbrough, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006.

Ketcham, Ralph, editor. The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. Penguin Books, 1986.

Lee, Richard Henry, and John Dickinson. Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, John Dickinson, Letters from a Federal Farmer, Richard Henry Lee. Edited by William E. Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.

Madison, James. Selected Writings of James Madison. Edited by Ralph Ketcham, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006.

Miles, Edwin A. “The Young American Nation and the Classical World.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 35, no. 2, Apr.-Jun. 1974, pp. 259–274.

Mullett, Charles F. “Classical Influences on the American Revolution.” The Classical Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, Nov. 1939, pp. 92–104.

Reinhold, Meyer. “Opponents of Classical Learning in America during the Revolutionary Period.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 112, no. 4, 15 Aug. 1968, pp. 221–234.

Richard, Carl J. Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2008.

Shalev, Eran. “Ancient Masks, American Fathers: Classical Pseudonyms during the American Revolution and Early Republic.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 23, no. 2, 2003, pp. 151–172.

——. Rome Reborn on Western Shores: Historical Imagination and the Creation of the American Republic. University of Virginia Press, 2009.

Sheehan, Colleen A., and Gary L. McDowell, editors. Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the ‘Other’ Federalists 1787-1788. Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998.